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BANKING LAW DEVELOPMENTS
Peter G. Weinstock * and Christopher T. Klimko**
I. INTRODUCTIONA has been the case during the last several years, litigation arising
from the insolvency of financial institutions dominated Texas bank-
ing law developments during 1991. The cases discussed in this
year's survey primarily attempt to determine the limits to the powers of bank
regulatory agencies in addressing insolvencies or near-insolvencies. The
lower court decisions reflect a willingness by the courts to examine at least
implicitly underlying issues of fairness and overreaching in the agencies' ac-
tions and a surprising willingness to hold against those agencies when a rea-
sonable basis for doing so exists. In the majority of these decisions, the
courts were not swayed by arguments of overarching public policy as a basis
for broad interpretations of regulatory powers. In both of the Supreme
Court cases' decided during the survey period, however, the justices unani-
mously ruled in favor of the regulatory agencies. Consequently, it would be
surprising if the lower court decisions represent a trend in favor of litigants
against the bank regulatory agencies.
II. CASE LAW
A. Receivership Litigation
1. Purchase and Assumption Transactions
City of Arlington v. FDIC2 examined the liability of an institution to an
accountholder for the actions of a predecessor insolvent institution. Shady
Valley West Joint Venture (Joint Venture) borrowed approximately $30 mil-
lion from First Texas Savings Association (First Texas) to finance a real
estate development project in Arlington, Texas. Subsequently Joint Venture,
First Texas, and the City of Arlington (Arlington) entered into an escrow
agreement requiring that a deposit maintained by Joint Venture at First
Texas be used to fund the construction of a thoroughfare through the project
and giving Arlington the right to draw on such funds if Joint Venture were
unable or unwilling to build it. Joint Venture defaulted on its loan from
* The author is a member of the Financial Institutions Section of Jenkens & Gilchrist,
P.C. The author lectures and writes frequently on topics concerning financial institutions.
** The author is a member of the Corporate Legal Department of Bank One, Texas,
N.A. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and are not attributable in
any manner to Bank One, Texas, N.A.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 48-66 and 94-121.
2. 752 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
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First Texas, and First Texas offset the escrow deposit against Joint Venture's
debt to First Texas. Upon learning of the offset, Arlington sued First Texas
to reinstate the account. First Texas was later declared insolvent and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was appointed as
receiver. The FSLIC transferred certain of First Texas' assets and liabilities
to First Gibraltar Bank, FSB (First Gibraltar), including all of First Texas'
liabilities to its depositors. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) was a party to this suit in its role as statutory successor to the
FSLIC in its corporate capacity, which had been made a defendant following
First Texas' failure.3
The district court determined that First Texas possessed actual knowledge
that the escrowed funds were held for a particular purpose and for the bene-
fit of Arlington and therefore that First Texas did not have the right to offset
the escrowed funds against Joint Venture's debt.4 Given that First Texas did
not have the right to offset, the offset was a nullity with respect to Arling-
ton.5 The fact that the offset was void defeated the argument put forward by
First Gibraltar and the FDIC that Arlington's claims were simply general
unsecured claims against the receivership estate of First Texas.6 Rather, the
district court concluded that Arlington was a depositor of First Texas at the
time that institution was declared insolvent.7 In light of the fact that First
Gibraltar had assumed a liability to each of First Texas' depositors for the
full amount of each deposit, the district court held that First Gibraltar had a
deposit liability to Arlington for the escrow deposit.8 The district court or-
dered First Gibraltar to reestablish the escrow deposit under the terms con-
tained in the escrow agreement in an amount equal to the amount that had
been wrongfully offset, plus interest from the date of offset to the date of
reestablishment.9
It is interesting to note that City of Arlington resulted in the imposition of
liability upon First Gibraltar despite the fact that First Gibraltar was not a
corporate successor to First Texas. Rather, First Gibraltar had purchased
certain of First Texas' assets and assumed certain of First Texas' liabilities,
presumably in part to avoid the assumption of liability for a predecessor's
wrongful acts that accompanies corporate succession. Yet, the City of Ar-
lington court chose to characterize First Texas' wrongful act and First Gi-
braltar's limited assumption of First Texas' liabilities in a manner that
resulted in First Gibraltar's unwitting assumption of First Texas' liability to
Arlington. The view urged by the FDIC and First Gibraltar in this case,
that Arlington's claim was a general claim for wrongful conduct against
3. Id. at 221.
4. Id. at 224-25.
5. Id. at 225.
6. The court stated that "It]he real question is whether an institution can, by unilateral
wrongful act, transform an insured account liability into a nullity, leaving the depositor with a
general unsecured claim. The law is clear that the wrongful acts of a failed institution do not
absolve the institution's successor from liability for insured deposits." Id.
7. 752 F. Supp. at 225.
8. Id. at 225-26.
9. Id. at 228.
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First Texas' receivership estate, was reasonable and easily could have been
adopted by the City of Arlington court. However, a comment made by the
court'0 suggests that it viewed its holding as the appropriate outcome be-
cause of the apparent unfairness of the result urged by the FDIC and First
Gibraltar and because the liability in question could be characterized as a
deposit liability instead of general liability for the acts of an entity that is not
a predecessor. City of Arlington illustrates the potential importance of un-
derlying questions of fairness and alternative means of framing liability ques-
tions in cases lacking clearly controlling statutory or case law authority.
2. FDIC Claims Against Third Parties
FDIC v. Ernst & Young Iinvolved an attempt by the FDIC to recover
$560 million in damages from the accounting firm of Ernst & Young (E&Y)
allegedly resulting from faulty audits of Western Savings Association (West-
ern) conducted by a predecessor of E&Y, Arthur Young & Company. The
FDIC was pursuing the claim as statutory successor to the FSLIC in its
corporate capacity.' 2 E&Y had been retained by Western to conduct audits
of Western during the years 1984 and 1985.13 The FDIC alleged that the
audits were negligently conducted and that if the audits had been accurate,
Western's board of directors would have halted the lending practices that led
to Western's insolvency and the injury for which the FDIC sought damages.
The district court's decision was rendered in the context of E&Y's motion
for summary judgment. 14
The district court first examined whether the FDIC was subject to the
same defenses as a typical assignee of Western. The FDIC argued that it
should not be treated as a typical assignee of Western and pointed for sup-
port to its special status under the D'Oench Duhme doctrine' 5 and in certain
10. See supra note 6.
11. No. 3-90-0490-H, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13955, (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Ernst].
12. Ernst, slip op. at 3.
13. Ernst, slip op. at 2-3.
14. Ernst, slip op. at 1.
15. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e), which provides:
(e) Agreements against interests of Corporation.
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the interest of the Corpo-
ration in any asset acquired by it under this section or section [1821 of this
title], either as security for a loan or by purchase or as receiver of any insured
depository institution, shall be valid against the Corporation unless such
agreement
(1) is in writing,
(2) was executed by the depository institution and any person claiming
an adverse interest thereunder, including the obligor, contemporane-
ously with the acquisition of the asset by the depository institution,
(3) was approved by the board of directors of the depository institution
or its loan committee, which approval shall be reflected in the min-
utes of said board or committee, and
(4) has been, continuously, from the time of its execution, an official rec-
ord of the depository institution.
12 U.S.C.S. § 1823(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
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cases seeking recovery under directors' and officers' liability insurance poli-
cies. 16 The district court rejected this argument, noting that neither situa-
tion applied in this case and that the FDIC had not cited any statutory
authority for treating the FDIC differently from other assignees under the
circumstances of this case.17 Rather, the district court adopted the reason-
ing of FDIC v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland,18 which stated that the FDIC is
entitled to avoid defenses to which an assignee is typically subject when act-
ing as a bank's receiver seeking to collect on a borrower's debts but not when
acting in its corporate capacity as an assignee.' 9
The district court next rejected the FDIC's contention that a showing of
detrimental reliance upon E&Y's audits by Western was not necessary to the
FDIC's recovery upon its negligence claim. The district court noted that
Texas courts have not expressly stated that reliance is a necessary element in
an accounting malpractice suit, but they have recognized that a client's dam-
ages in such a suit stem from a reliance upon the accuracy of the account-
ant's work. 20 The court also noted that other jurisdictions have expressly
held that reliance is a necessary element of an accounting malpractice suit
asserting negligence. 2'
The final element of the court's holding addressed whether or not the ac-
tual knowledge of Jarrett Woods (Woods) of Western's true financial condi-
tion should have been imputed to Western. Woods had been Western's
chairman of the board of directors, chief executive officer and sole stock-
holder.22 The court observed that the general rule is that the knowledge of
individuals who exercise substantial control over a corporation's affairs is
imputable to the corporation. 23 The FDIC asserted, however, that an excep-
tion to the general rule exists under circumstances in which the controlling
individual's interests are adverse to the corporation's and that in this case
Woods's interests were adverse to Western's. 24 The court replied that under
Texas law, the determination of whether Woods's interests were adverse to
Western's depended upon whether Western's stockholders were the benefi-
ciaries or victims of Woods's fraudulent actions. 25 If the stockholders were
beneficiaries, Woods's interests were not adverse to Western's; conversely, if
the stockholders were victims, Woods's interests were adverse to Western's.
Woods was Western's sole stockholder and he was also the beneficiary of his
own fraudulent activity. Consequently, the court reasoned that Woods's in-
terests were not adverse to Western's interests. As a result, the general rule
16. Ernst, slip op. at 6.
17. Ernst, slip op. at 7.
18. 742 F. Supp. 612 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
19. Id. at 614-15.
20. Ernst, slip op. at 9, citing Greenstein, Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d
170, 186 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
21. Ernst, slip op. at 9, citing E.F. Hutton Mortgage Corp. v. Pappas, 690 F. Supp. 1465
(D. Md. 1988), Delmar Vineyard v. Timmons, 486 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
22. Ernst, slip op. at 11.
23. Ernst, slip op. at 10-11.
24. Ernst, slip op. at 11.
25. Ernst, slip op. at 12-13.
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imputing Woods's knowledge of Western's true financial condition to West-
ern was applicable. 26
The imputation of Woods's knowledge to Western meant that Woods's
knowledge was also imputed to the FDIC because of the FDIC's status as
Western's assignee, and therefore the FDIC could not recover because it
could not prove detrimental reliance upon E&Y's audits. The court granted
summary judgment to E&Y.27
Ernst represents a significant threat to the FDIC's attempt to defray a
portion of the cost of thrift and bank failures through recoveries from
outside professionals engaged by the insolvent institutions. This case is the
first such ruling against a federal bank regulatory agency, and could have
application to a large number of similar suits filed or contemplated by the
FDIC.28 Although Ernst dealt with accounting malpractice and relied heav-
ily in places upon prior cases dealing with such malpractice, the reasoning in
the case could be extended to cases involving other types of outside profes-
sionals. It also remains to be seen how broadly Ernst is applied to situations
other than those in which a single individual was the sole stockholder and
had management control of an insolvent institution, such as situations in-
volving ownership and control by a defined group of individuals and situa-
tions in which controlling stock ownership and management control were
separated. The ultimate impact of Ernst will depend upon the extent to
which the holding is applied to these differing circumstances. Nevertheless,
the reasoning of the court could easily be applied by other courts and thus
could undermine the FDIC's currently pending accounting and legal mal-
practice suits, as well as future suits resulting from the ongoing investigation
of approximately 1,200 insolvent institutions, many of which were closely
held. 29 The FDIC has indicated that it intends to file an appeal of the hold-
ing in Ernst.30
3. Director's and Officer's Liability Insurance
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Corner3 addressed the enforceabil-
ity of a regulatory exclusion clause contained in a director's and officer's
liability policy (the Policy) issued by Fidelity & Deposit Company of Mary-
land (Fidelity) to Northwest Commercial Bank, N.A. (Northwest). 32 The
regulatory exclusion clause denied coverage under the Policy for any claim
made against a covered officer or director by any state or federal official or
agency, including the FDIC.3 3 Northwest failed and the FDIC was ap-
pointed as receiver. The FDIC subsequently sued certain of the former of-
26. Ernst, slip op. at 13.
27. Ernst, slip op. at 14.
28. Sherry R. Sontag, Audit Ruling May Portend Other Losses, THE NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28,
1991, at 3.
29. Id. at 26, col. 3.
30. Id. at 26, col. 2.
31. No. H-89-0872, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11874, (S.D. Tex. May 31, 1991) [hereinafter
Corner].
32. Corner, slip op. at 1.
33. Corner, slip op. at 7-8.
12691992]
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ficers and directors of Northwest for their failure to manage Northwest in a
proper and prudent manner. Following a demand by most of the defendant
officers and directors that Fidelity provide a defense against the FDIC law-
suit, Fidelity filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that the
regulatory exclusion clause excepted the FDIC's claims from coverage under
the Policy. 34 The FDIC then intervened in Fidelity's lawsuit.
The FDIC asserted that the Policy's regulatory exclusion clause was void
and unenforceable because it conflicted with public policy and federal law.35
The district court stated that for contractual provisions to be void for public
policy reasons they typically must induce criminal conduct or contradict
statutory law. The court then noted that the only case decided in Texas that
had previously considered the validity of a regulatory exclusion clause of a
director's and officer's liability policy had held that such a clause did not
violate public policy because it did not meet this standard. 36 The district
court next observed that the statute3 7 entitling the FDIC as receiver to en-
force contracts of an insolvent institution despite such contracts' terms to
the contrary specifically excepts director's and officer's liability insurance
from its coverage. 38 Furthermore, the legislative record demonstrated that
in adopting this statute Congress did not intend to legislate with regard to
the validity of regulatory exclusion clauses contained in director's and of-
ficer's liability policies. 39 The district court also rejected the FDIC's conten-
tion that the regulatory exclusion clause infringed upon the FDIC's
statutory right as receiver of an insolvent institution to marshall and collect
the assets of Northwest. The district court reasoned that any proceeds of the
Policy were an asset of Northwest's officers and directors, not of Northwest.
Therefore, the FDIC did not have any statutory right to collect Policy pro-
ceeds that could be infringed. 40 Without further elaboration, the district
court held the Policy's regulatory exclusion clause to be valid and
enforceable. 4 1
As is the case with the holding in Ernst,42 Corner represents a threat to the
34. Corner, slip op. at 3.
35. Corner, slip op. at 7.
36. Corner slip op. at 8-9, citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Allen, 710 F. Supp. 1088,
1098-99 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(12)(A), which provides:
(12) Authority to enforce contracts
(A) In general
The conservator or receiver may enforce any contract, other than a direc-
tor's or officer's liability insurance contract or a depository institution
bond, entered into by the depository institution notwithstanding any pro-
vision of the contract providing for termination, default, acceleration, or
exercise of rights upon, or solely by reason of, insolvency or the appoint-
ment of a conservator or receiver.
12 U.S.C.S. § 1821(e)(12)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
38. Corner, slip op. at 11.
39. Corner, slip op. at 11, n.5, citing 135 Cong. Rec. S10198 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1989)
(statement of Sen. Garn).
40. Corner, slip op. at 12.
41. Corner, slip op. at 13.
42. See supra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
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FDIC's attempt to defray a portion of the cost of thrift and bank failures
through recoveries from third-party sources. Unlike Ernst, however, the
question addressed in Corner has been examined by a number of courts
throughout the country, with some courts finding the regulatory exclusion
clause enforceable 43 and others finding it void as against public policy." It
appears that the trend is toward enforcement of the regulatory exclusion
clause.45 The FDIC, the U.S. Treasury Department and the U.S. Justice
Department released a joint study on September 13, 1991, urging Congress
to adopt legislation precluding the enforcement of regulatory exclusion
clauses against the FDIC as receiver of insolvent financial institutions on
public policy grounds.46 The joint study argues that Congressional action is
needed in order to overcome the trend in the courts to enforce such
clauses.47 It is an open question whether such legislation would have retro-
active effect.
B. Sovereign Immunity
The Supreme Court in U.S. v. Gaubert48 considered the scope of the gov-
ernment's immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).49 Thomas
Gaubert (Gaubert) was the chairman of the board and largest shareholder of
Independent American Savings Association (IASA). The Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (the FHLBB) and the Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas
(the FHLB-Dallas) desired for IASA to merge with Investex Savings (Inves-
tex), a savings and loan association that was failing. The FHLBB and the
FHLB-Dallas were concerned regarding the nature of Gaubert's activities.
Accordingly, the FHLBB and the FHLB-Dallas asked Gaubert to execute a
"neutralization agreement" effectively eliminating his authority over IASA's
affairs. They also asked Gaubert to guarantee that IASA's capital would
exceed the regulatory minimum levels and to secure such guarantee with an
interest in real estate with a value of $25 million. Gaubert agreed to these
conditions. Consequently, the FHLBB and the FHLB-Dallas approved the
merger.
After the merger was effected, the FHLB-Dallas threatened to declare
43. E.g., American Casualty Co. v. FDIC, 944 F.2d 455 (8th Cir. 1991); FDIC v.
Zaborac, 773 F. Supp. 137 (C.D. Ill. 1991); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 765 F.
Supp. 538 (D. Minn. 1991); Finci v. American Casualty Co., 323 Md. 358, 593 A.2d 1069
(1991).
44. E.g., Branning v. CNA Ins. Cos., 721 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Wash. 1989); FSLIC v.
Oldenburg, 671 F. Supp. 720 (D. Utah 1987).
45. An area of litigation presenting similar issues concerns the enforceability of provisions
contained in bankers' blanket bonds that automatically terminate the bonds' coverage upon the
taking over of the insured financial institution by a receiver or other liquidator or by state or
federal officials. It appears that the trend is toward enforcement of these automatic termina-
tion provisions as well. See California Union Ins. Co. v. American Diversified Savings Bank,
948 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 903 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir.
1990).
46. D&O Study Says Legislative Action Needed to Address Court Decisions Against FDIC,
57 BANKING REP. 511 (Sept. 30, 1991).
47. Id.
48. 111 S.Ct. 1267 (1991).
49. 28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
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IASA insolvent unless IASA's directors resigned. The FHLB-Dallas then
recommended individuals to serve as directors and officers, which individu-
als IASA then elected and appointed. Thereafter, the FHLB-Dallas became
even more involved in IASA's affairs. The FHLB-Dallas provided advice
concerning IASA's hiring of a consultant, placing its subsidiaries in bank-
ruptcy, mediating employment disputes, and drafting of litigation pleadings.
The FHLB-Dallas also recommended that IASA convert to a federal char-
ter. IASA uniformly followed the FHLB-Dallas's advice.
Prior to the election of new directors, it was believed that IASA possessed
a significant net worth. Subsequently, the new board announced that IASA
was insolvent. Ultimately IASA was closed. In response, Gaubert filed suit
against the FHLBB, the FHLB-Dallas, and the FSLIC seeking damages of
$75 million for the lost value of his shares of IASA stock and $25 million for
his interest in real estate that had secured his guarantee of IASA's solvency.
The regulators contended that Gaubert's claims were barred by the discre-
tionary function exception (the Discretionary Function Exception) of the
FTCA.50 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Discre-
tionary Function Exception did not protect the FHLB-Dallas' involvement
in IASA's day-to-day affairs. 51 The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Dis-
cretionary Function Exception applied to policy decisions and not opera-
tional issues. The Supreme Court reversed. 52
Justice White, writing for the unanimous Court, stated that when Con-
gress provides the Executive Branch or an administrative agency with the
authority to achieve a social, economic, or political objective, the decisions
concerning the means to achieve such goals are protected by the Discretion-
ary Function Exception. 53 Justice White then discussed provisions that
mandate conduct as compared to those that provide regulatory agencies with
discretion. If a regulation requires a government official to take a particular
action and the individual does so, then that conduct is protected. 54 Con-
versely, if the government official acts contrary to the specific mandate of a
regulation, then that individual and the government are subject to liability
for such conduct.55 When statutes, regulations, or agency guidelines or
other agency pronouncements provide employees of such agencies with dis-
50. The Discretionary Function Exception protects the government for liability in con-
nection with:
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of
a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discre-
tion involved be abused.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2680(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
51. 885 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1989). For a discussion of the decision by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit see Peter G. Weinstock, Banking Law Developments 1990, 44 Sw.
L.J. 709 (1990).
52. 111 S.Ct. 1267.





cretion in forwarding the goals embodied in a government prescription, a
tort claim will be barred unless it alleges that the conduct was not within the
scope of the purpose the administrative program was developed to achieve. 56
The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's policymaking/operational issue di-
chotomy because discretionary conduct is not limited to formulation of pol-
icy. The Court then applied these standards to the actions of the FHLB-
Dallas in Gaubert.
The Court determined that the FHLB-Dallas's conduct was not con-
trolled by statutory or regulatory mandates.57 Instead, the relevant statutes
and the FHLBB's policies vested broad discretion in both the FHLBB and
the FHLB-Dallas to respond to unsafe practices.5" The Court noted that the
agency conduct was intended to safeguard the solvency of, and to preserve
public confidence in, the thrift industry, as well as to maintain IASA's as-
sets.59 Both of these objectives were consistent with the purposes reflected in
the FHLBB Policy and the relevant statutes. The FHLB-Dallas's conduct,
in turn, attempted to forward these purposes.
Justice Scalia concurred with the judgment in Gaubert, but he would have
applied a different test concerning application of the Discretionary Function
Exception; Justice Scalia proffered a two part test: (i) should "social, eco-
nomic or political" policy considerations be evaluated in making the decision
and (ii) whether the official's responsibilities encompass analysis of such
considerations. 6° Under Justice Scalia's test, even if policy considerations
appropriately should be examined by the government in pursuing an action,
the government still may be liable if the official taking the action does not
possess the authority to weigh such issues. Accordingly, the Discretionary
Function Exception might apply differently to the same conduct depending
upon the scope of the official's authority.6'
56. Id. at 1274-75.
57. Id. at 1277.
58. The FHLBB adopted a policy governing when it would adopt administrative actions
governing savings and loan associations. 111 S.Ct. at 1277 quoting, FHLBB Resolution No.
82-381 (May 26, 1982), reprinted in Brief for Respondent 4a-6a (hereinafter "FHLBB Pol-
icy"). The FHLBB Policy stated:
[t]he Board recognizes that supervisory actions must be tailored to each case,
and that such actions will vary according to the severity of the violation of law
or regulation or the unsafe or unsound practice, as well as to the responsiveness
and willingness of the association to take corrective action. The following gui-
dance should be considered for all supervisory actions.
In each case, based upon an assessment of management's willingness to take
appropriate corrective action and the potential harm to the institution if correc-
tive action is not effected, the staff must weigh the appropriateness of available
supervisory actions....
Thus, the FHLBB Policy provided wide latitude in fashioning an administrative response to
perceived problems. Id. at 1277.
59. 111 S.Ct. at 1278.
60. Id. at 1280.
61. Justice Scalia used the circumstances at issue in Indian Towing Co. v. United States,
350 U.S. 61 (1956), to illustrate the application of his test. In Indian Towing, the government
was held liable because Coast Guard maintenance workers failed to inspect lighthouse equip-
ment. Id. at 69. Justice Scalia observed that there can be economic policy justifications for
conducting only cursory inspections, but such a decision was not within the responsibilities of
1992] 1273
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In Gaubert, the regulators advised IASA to take certain actions; other-
wise, the FHLBB would appoint a conservator or receiver. Justice Scalia
observed that the decision whether to place a bank in conservatorship or
receivership is the type of determination that should be based on an evalua-
tion of policy considerations. 62 Under Justice Scalia's test, such a decision
will only be protected if it is made by people charged with examining such
considerations. Justice Scalia implicitly determined that the FHLBB and
the FHLB-Dallas officials were of a level authorized to make the policy
choices at issue in Gaubert because he held that the Discretionary Function
Exception protected the actions in question.
The Gaubert decision severely limits the ability of shareholders and other
aggrieved parties to recover damages for negligent government actions. The
government contended that such a limitation on tort actions was necessary
in order to avoid a torrent of such suits arising out of the precipitous state of
the savings and loan industry. 63 Even if the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Gaubert, however, it is difficult to imag-
ine that many tort claims against the government would survive summary
judgment. In order to avoid dismissal of the complaint, shareholders of an
insolvent institution would need to allege that they suffered a particularized
injury, such as the interest in real property pledged to the FHLBB by
Gaubert, which was not shared by shareholders generally. 64
The Gaubert decision will have a significant impact on the ability of share-
holders to contest the regulatory determination that an institution is insol-
vent or otherwise should be closed. Congress, in the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991,65 mandated that regula-
tors must take certain actions, including closure of an institution, even
before the institution's net worth is exhausted. One effect of the Gaubert
decision will be to shield such actions from liability. 66
the maintenance personnel who made it. Thus, the Discretionary Function Exception did not
shield their conduct. 111 S.Ct. at 1280.
62. 111 S.Ct. at 1281-82.
63. The government contended that it was defending 132 tort actions in which an aggre-
gate of $3.3 billion in damages was claimed. Court's Thrift Ruling Is No Surprise Victory, THE
NAT'L L.J., April 8, 1991, at 27. The Gaubert decision is already resulting in dismissals of
such suits. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stuart, 761 F. Supp. 31 (W.D. La. 1991) (The Discretionary
Function Exception of the FTCA barred the former officers and directors of an insolvent bank
from raising the alleged negligence of the FDIC as receiver as a defense to a breach of duty
action).
64. See Peter G. Weinstock, Directors and Officers of Failing Banks.: Pitfalls and Precau-
tions, 106 BANKING L.J. 434, 444 (1989).
65. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2235 § 131(h)(3) (hereinafter FDIC Improvement
Act). See also Kenneth H. Bacon, Cracking Down: The New Banking Law Toughens Regula-
tion, Some Say Too Much, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1991, at AI (new banking legislation autho-
rizes the regulators to close banks with positive net worths under certain conditions).
66. Because of Supreme Court's Gaubert Ruling Regulators Have Immunity in Early Inter-
vention Actions, THE THRIFr REGULATOR, April 12, 1991, at 1 (Hal Levi, a former FHLBB
attorney, believes the Gaubert decision allows regulators to take control of a solvent financial
institution without such action being an impermissible "taking" under the U.S. Constitution);
See also FDIC v. Irwin, 916 F.2d 1051, 1052 (5th Cir. 1990) (decided prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Gaubert) (the determination by the Comptroller of the Currency that a




1. Civil Money Penalties
Amberg v. FDIC67 involved an appeal from an assessment of civil money
penalties upon the directors of a state chartered bank. The directors filed a
request for hearing thirteen days after the documents giving notice of the
civil money penalties were first served, and an answer twenty four days after
those documents were first served. The FDIC moved for entry of a default
order against the directors on the basis that their answer was not timely,
which motion was denied by the administrative law judge conducting the
hearing but later granted by the Board of Directors of the FDIC (the Board)
on appeal. The directors then filed for review of the Board's decision with
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In considering whether the late filing of the directors' answer justified the
Board's entry of a default judgment, the appeals court turned to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (the Federal Rules), from which the FDIC explic-
itly borrowed in developing its own rules of procedure. 6 The appeals court
observed that Rules 55(C) 6 9 and 60(b)70 of the Federal Rules clearly indicate
that strict enforcement of defaults is to be avoided and, if good cause for
excusing a technical default exists, the default should be excused. 71 The ap-
peals court noted that there were considerable factors to warrant a finding of
good cause in this case, including the directors' timely request for a hearing,
the directors' actual (although late) filing of an answer prior to the FDIC's
motion for default, and the directors' alleged oral notification to the FDIC
that they intended to contest the assessment. The appeals court stated that
within the Fifth Circuit a motion to set aside a default judgment is evaluated
under Rule 60(b)(1) 72 of the Federal Rules on the basis of (i) prejudice to
the plaintiff, (ii) the merits of the defendant's asserted defense, and (iii) the
culpability of the defendant's conduct. 73 The court determined that all three
67. 934 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1991).
68. Id. at 685.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides:
(c) Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set
it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides in part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceed-
ing for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judg-
ment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
71. 934 F.2d at 686.
72. See supra note 70.
73. 934 F.2d at 686.
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factors were in the directors' favor. 74 Given the FDIC's reliance upon the
Federal Rules in the formulation of its rules of procedure, the relevant provi-
sions of the Federal Rules and the standards established by the Fifth Circuit
in interpreting those provisions, the Board's entry of the default was an
abuse of discretion and therefore was reversed. 75
The appeals court went on to explain that in arriving at its conclusion it
also considered the appropriateness of the FDIC's regulation requiring the
directors to file an answer within twenty days of receiving notification of the
assessment of penalties. 76 The court noted that deference is due to the rules
and regulations promulgated by an agency to carry out the provisions of an
enabling statute when the rules and regulations are reasonably related to the
statute's purpose. 77 However, the appeals court seemed troubled by the fact
that nowhere in the statute providing for hearings in conjunction with the
assessment of civil money penalties78 was there a requirement that an answer
be filed in order for the directors to obtain a hearing. Although the discus-
sion is unclear on this point, the court appears to have concluded that the
absence of a statutory requirement for the filing of an answer and the fact
that Congress had recently acted to extend the deadline for filing a request
for hearing from ten to twenty days brought the directors' automatic default
and the FDIC procedural rules on which it was based into conflict with the
enabling statute.79 This reasoning provided an additional basis for the rever-
sal of the Board's action by the appeals court.
2. Net Worth Maintenance Agreements
In RTC v. Tetco,80 the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), as conserva-
tor for Bexar Savings Association (Bexar) brought suit against Bexar's par-
ent, Tetco, Inc. (Tetco) to enforce the provisions of a net worth maintenance
agreement. In 1985, Tetco acquired all of the shares of Bexar. Subse-
quently, Bexar applied to the FSLIC requesting insurance of its deposit ac-
counts. The FHLBB, as a prerequisite for such insurance, required Tetco to
register as a savings and loan holding company. The FHLBB approved
Tetco's holding company application on the condition that Tetco agree that
if Bexar's net worth were to fall below regulatory minimum levels, Tetco
would restore Bexar's net worth or cause it to be restored. Tetco agreed to
the FHLBB's terms. Thereafter, Bexar suffered significant losses, with the
74. Id. at 687.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 687-89.
77. Id. at 687.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j)(4)(F), which provides:
(F) Hearing. The nonmember insured bank, savings association, or other per-
son against whom any penalty is assessed under this paragraph shall be afforded
an agency hearing if such nonmember insured bank, savings association, or
other person submits a request for such hearing within 20 days after the issuance
of the notice of assessment. Section [1818(h) of this title] shall apply to any
proceeding under this paragraph.
12 U.S.C.S. § 1828(j)(4)(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
79. Id. at 688.
80. 758 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
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result that it was declared insolvent and the FSLIC was appointed as conser-
vator. The RTC succeeded to the FSLIC's position as conservator.
The RTC brought a cause of action against Tetco seeking to enforce the
net worth maintenance agreement. In response, Tetco contended that it al-
ready controlled Bexar when it submitted its application to become a savings
and loan holding company. Tetco argued that it was lawfully entitled to
register as a holding company without making any commitments. Accord-
ingly, the FHLBB did not provide any consideration in exchange for Tetco's
net worth maintenance commitment.
The RTC contended that the FSLIC's granting of deposit insurance to
Bexar served as consideration for Tetco's commitment. Tetco responded
that it did not make any commitments in Bexar's application for deposit
insurance. Moreover, Tetco argued that the net worth maintenance commit-
ment was not bargained for as part of an agreement, but instead, was given
in response to a regulatory requirement in the application process.
The Tetco court assumed that Tetco was obligated to register as a holding
company, and that the FHLBB was authorized to impose conditions on such
registration. Nonetheless, the Tetco court determined that the FHLBB's re-
quirement of a capital commitment was part of the approval process, and did
not represent bargained for consideration. The parties never negotiated any
terms of the agreement, and the FHLBB's regulations set forth all of the
provisions of the net worth maintenance agreement. Thus, Tetco was fulfil-
ling the FHLBB's prerequisites for approval.81
The Tetco court distinguished the circumstances involving Tetco and
Bexar from other cases in which courts upheld capital maintenance agree-
ments as enforceable contracts.8 2 In those cases, the parties engaged in ex-
tensive negotiations with the FHLBB, as a result of which the FHLBB
granted forbearance from enforcement of certain capital requirements.8 3
The Tetco court believed that it would be difficult to conclude a contract
exists based on a reliance argument when the government does not materi-
ally alter its stance but instead mandates compliance with its existing
regulations.84
Tetco argued that there are no private causes of action to enforce a regula-
tory condition under the applicable banking statutes. Consequently, the
RTC lacked standing to enforce Tetco's compliance with the FHLBB's capi-
81. Id. at 1163.
82. Far West Federal, S.B. v. Director, OTS, 746 F. Supp. 1042 (D. Or. 1990) (although
the Tetco court referred to the district court decision, that case was subsequently reversed on
appeal). The FHLBB solicited venture capitalists to acquire a savings and loan association,
negotiated terms of a conversion agreement with them, and agreed to forebear from enforce-
ment of capital requirements against them. Id. at 1045; and Winstar Corp. and United States
Federal Savings Bank v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990). Winstar agreed to acquire an
ailing savings and loan association in exchange for the FHLBB's agreeing to treat the associa-
tion's deficit capital as goodwill to be amortized over 35 years. The Winstar court determined
that no purchaser would have acquired the institution absent the favorable accounting treat-
ment of the deficit. Id. at 115.
83. 746 F. Supp. 1042 and 21 Ct.CI. 112.
84. 758 F. Supp. at 1164.
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tal maintenance regulations. The Tetco court not only agreed with Tetco,
but stated that the RTC would have lacked standing even if Tetco's commit-
ments were held to be part of a contract.8 5 The Tetco court noted that the
award requested by the RTC was almost identical to the administrative rem-
edies that would have been sought to enforce compliance with the regula-
tion.86 Congress did not grant the regulatory agencies the right to enforce
compliance with regulations in a private suit. Thus, the court concluded
that the reasons to deny standing would be equally applicable to a contract
action brought by the RTC.87
The result in Tetco does not mean that the regulators lack a means to
enforce capital maintenance commitments. The OTS, as the successor to the
FHLBB, is empowered by FIRREA to take certain administrative actions,
including the assessment of civil money penalties, for failure to comply with
a commitment made to an administrative agency in the application con-
text.88 Although the issues the OTS would be required to consider in an
administrative action89 differ from those applicable to a private cause of ac-
tion, the result from the standpoint of parties such as Tetco might be the
same. (Such enforcement powers, however, do not apply to commitments
made prior to the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)). 90
Recent legislation also diminishes the likelihood that a company can avoid
capital maintenance commitments by resort to bankruptcy. The Compre-
hensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution Act and Taxpayer Recovery Act
of 1990 (title XXV of the Crime Control Act of 1990)91 provides that the
bankruptcy trustee or the debtor-in-possession is deemed to have assumed
any capital maintenance commitment. Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code
was also amended to afford the regulators' claims based upon net worth
maintenance agreements with priority in bankruptcy. 92
In an analogous area, parties have attempted to have courts enforce the
FHLBB's "agreement" to treat "supervisory goodwill" (the capital deficit of
an ailing institution acquired pursuant to a merger arranged by the FHLBB)
as capital. Although the results are inconclusive, the OTS has had success in
seeking to have courts determine that it is not bound by such "agree-
ments." 93 In such cases, the OTS is effectively seeking a contrary determina-
85. Id. at 1165.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(i)(2)(A)(iii) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
89. The OTS is required to consider the following factors in determining the amount of
any civil money penalty: (i) financial resources, (ii) good faith, (iii) gravity of violation,
(iv) history of previous violations and (v) such other matters as justice may require. See 12
U.S.C.S. § 1818(i)(2)(G) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
90. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 476 (1989) at § 907(1) (the amendments to the OTS'
civil money penalty authority only apply prospectively.)
91. Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 2522(c), 104 Stat. 4789, 4859, 4866 (1990).
92. 11 U.S.C.S. § 507(a)(8)(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
93. Franklin Fed. Say. Bank v. Director, OTS, 927 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that FIRREA permits the OTS to disregard capital forbearance agreements), cert. denied 112
S.Ct. 370 (1991). See also Debra Cope, OTS Gaining Upper Hand on Goodwill?, AM. BANKER
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tion regarding the existence of an enforceable contract to that requested by
the RTC in Tetco.
3. The Source of Strength Policy
In Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp94 the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to rule on whether there is any statutory basis for
the "Source of Strength" Policy. 95 Instead, the Court determined that the
issues presented were not ripe for review.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve)
alleged that MCorp violated the Source of Strength Policy. In response, the
Federal Reserve commenced proceedings to issue cease-and-desist orders
that, among other things, would require MCorp96 to use all of its assets to
increase the capital of its subsidiary banks. Thereafter, creditors filed a peti-
tion placing MCorp into bankruptcy. MCorp contended that the Federal
Reserve's administrative proceedings were stayed under the Bankruptcy
Code. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal Re-
serve lacked the statutory authority to promulgate the Source of Strength
Policy. 97 Accordingly, any order promulgated based on the Source of
Strength Policy could be enjoined.
The Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing certain of the statutes
providing the Federal Reserve with authority over bank holding companies.
The Court noted that 12 U.S.C. § 1818(C) authorizes the Federal Reserve to
issue temporary cease-and-desist orders that take effect once they are served
upon a bank holding company. The holding company may then seek judi-
cial review of the temporary cease and desist order.98 Similarly, 12 U.S.C.S.
§ 1818(h) permits courts to consider a final decision of the Federal Re-
serve.99 The Court stated, however, that neither of these provisions were
applicable to MCorp. Accordingly, 12 U.S.C.S. § 1818(i) governed the
court's jurisdiction in MCorp. This statute provides that:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided in this section [§ 1818] no court shall
have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or
enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review,
modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order.10°
MCorp argued that the jurisdictional bar provided by 12 U.S.C. § 1818
May 17, 1991, at 1 (the tide of judicial decisions is turning in favor of the OTS's position that
supervisory goodwill may not be treated as capital).
94. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
95. Id. at 461. The Source of Strength Policy essentially requires a holding company to
serve as a source of strength by providing financial and managerial assistance to its subsidiary
banks. For a discussion of the origins of the Source of Strength Policy Statement, see Peter G.
Weinstock, Source of Strength Policy May Weaken Holding Companies, 171 THE BANKERS
MAGAZINE, May-June 1988, at 34.
96. The term MCorp includes two of MCorp's subsidiaries: MCorp Financial, Inc. and
MCorp Management. 112 S. Ct. at 461 n.4.
97. MCorp Financial Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 900 F.2d
852 (5th Cir. 1990).
98. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (Supp. I 1989).
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h) (Supp. 1 1989).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(l) (Supp. 1 1989).
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did not preclude an automatic stay under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code 1° '
or a bankruptcy court from prohibiting another party from exercising juris-
diction over a debtor's assets.' 0 2  The Court rejected MCorp's
contentions. 103
The Court stated that the automatic stay does not apply to an action to
"enforce a governmental unit's police or regulatory power."' 1 4 MCorp con-
tended that a court must evaluate the validity of the proposed police or regu-
latory action before deciding whether the automatic stay reaches such
action. The Court stated that MCorp's approach would result in inappropri-
ate bankruptcy court involvement in police and regulatory conduct. 0 5
MCorp also contended that the Bankruptcy Code prohibits parties from
seeking the assets of a debtor other than through the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. 10 6 The Court, however, stated that the Federal Reserve had merely
commenced its proceeding. 10 7 Accordingly, the Federal Reserve had not yet
attempted to exercise control over MCorp's assets. If the Federal Reserve
were to issue a final order seeking MCorp's assets and sought judicial en-
forcement of such an order, then bankruptcy court concurrent jurisdiction
may be appropriate.0 8
Although the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the same
conclusion concerning the application of the Bankruptcy Code provisions, it
nonetheless asserted that the Supreme Court's decision in Leedom v. Kyne 109
authorized the Court of Appeals to consider whether any agency action ex-
ceeded its statutory powers. 10 The Supreme Court stated that Kyne, which
permitted judicial review of a National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) cer-
tification order, differed from the facts concerning MCorp in two material
respects.
First, the NLRB in Kyne asserted that the courts never had jurisdiction to
review NLRB determinations."I I The Court stated that courts generally will
not infer that Congress intended to bar access forever to a judicial forum to
contest agency abuses. In contrast, MCorp is entitled to judicial review, but
only if the Federal Reserve issues a final order concluding that MCorp vio-
lated the Source of Strength Policy. 112
Second, in Kyne the NLRB asked the Court to infer that Congress in-
101. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
102. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3),(a)(6) (1988).
103. 112 S. Ct. at 463.
104. Id. at 464 quoting I I U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1988).
105. Id.
106. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3),(a)(6) (1988).
107. 112 S. Ct. at 464.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988).
The Court stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1334 answers the question of jurisdiction as
between a bankruptcy court and other courts but does not address jurisdiction
between a bankruptcy court and an administrative agency proceeding.
112 S. Ct. at 464.
109. 358 U.S. 184 (1958).
110. 900 F.2d at 858.
111. Id. at 190.
112. 112 S. Ct. at 466.
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tended to bar judicial review of NLRB determinations.1 3 Title 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818 clearly sets forth the scope of judicial review of agency conduct.' 14
In other words, a judicial inference concerning Congressional intent in
adopting 12 U.S.C. § 1818 was unnecessary because the statute explicitly
stated the Congressional mandate.
The Court stated that Kyne merely stands for the familiar proposition that
"only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence of a contrary legisla-
tive intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."' 1 5 Title 12
U.S.C. § 1818 provides a "clear and convincing" statement that judicial re-
view of the Federal Reserve's proceedings is not permissible until a final
order is issued." 6 Thus, the Court reversed the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals. 117
The Federal Reserve responded to the Court's decision by filing an emer-
gency motion to delay confirmation of MCorp's reorganization plan.l" 8 The
Bankruptcy Court denied both the Federal Reserve's request and MCorp's
plan." 9  Currently, MCorp and the Federal Reserve are engaged in
negotiations.
Even after the Supreme Court's decision, the issue of whether the Federal
Reserve exceeded its statutory authority by adopting the Source of Strength
Policy still has not been resolved.' 20 Although the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is no longer effective, it was the highest court to
address the issue, and it would have abrogated the Source of Strength Policy.
Nonetheless, the issue may now have been mooted by a Congressional
compromise.
The FDIC Improvement Act incorporates much of the Source of Strength
Policy by statute.' 2' The FDIC Improvement Act requires "undercapital-
ized" ' 22 financial institutions to adopt a capital restoration plan.' 23 If the
institution is owned by a holding company, then an agency may not accept
the plan absent receipt of a holding company guarantee of the plan. Unlike
the Source of Strength Policy, however, a holding company's guarantee is
limited under the FDIC Improvement Act.' 24 Moreover, a holding com-
113. 358 U.S. at 190.
114. 112 S. Ct. at 466.
115. Id. quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
116. 112 S. Ct. at 466.
117. Id.
118. MCorp Remand, Bank Bailout, LITIG. NEWS Jan. 23, 1992 at 3.
119. Id.
120. Kenneth Cline, Top Court Backs Fed in MCorp Dispute, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 1991,
at 2. The Supreme Court's ruling does not resurrect the Federal Reserve's Source of Strength
Policy. Id.
121. FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, sec. 131, § 38, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253 (1991).
122. The FDIC Improvement Act defines an "undercapitalized" financial institution as an
institution that is not in compliance with any required capital ratio. Id. § 38(b)(1)(c), 105 Stat.
at 2253.
123. Id. § 38(e)(2), 105 Stat. at 2256.
124. Id. § 38(e)(2)(E), 105 Stat. at 2257. The guarantee is limited to:
The lesser of:
(i) an amount equal to 5 percent of the institution's total assets at the time the
institution became undercapitalized; or
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pany may elect not to guarantee the plan but instead opt for its financial
institution subsidiary to fail. In light of the cross-guarantee provisions of
FIRREA, however, the failure of one financial institution subsidiary could
result in the FDIC billing the failed financial institution's sister institutions
for the cost of resolution. 125
A broader effect of the MCorp holding will be to prevent judicial chal-
lenges to ongoing agency enforcement proceedings. 126 This will enable the
regulators to act quickly when they deem it expedient to do so. Unfortu-
nately, a private party's resources might be exhausted by the time the agency




In Stauffer v. Henderson 127 the Supreme Court of Texas considered
whether the language of a depository contract created a right of survivorship
in favor of the cosignatory on a checking account. Marian Henderson and
her sister, Mary K. Stauffer, established a joint bank account. The deposi-
tory contract provided:
JOINT ACCOUNT - PAYABLE TO EITHER OR SURVIVOR
We agree and declare that all funds now or hereafter deposited in this
account are and shall be our joint property, that either of us shall have
power to act in all matters relating to such account, whether the other
be living or dead, and that upon the death of either of us any balance in
said account or any part thereof may be withdrawn by, or upon the
order of the survivor. It is especially agreed that withdrawal offunds by
the survivor shall be binding upon us and upon our heirs, next of kin,
legatees, assigns and personal representatives .... [The depository] is
hereby authorized to act without further inquiry in accordance with
writings bearing any [signature of Marian or Mary], and any such pay-
ment or delivery or a receipt or acquittance signed by [Marian or Mary]
shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge of [the
depository]. 12 8
Mrs. Henderson died and her sister withdrew the funds from the account,
all of which Mrs. Henderson had deposited. Mrs. Henderson's husband, the
executor of her estate, claimed such funds were community property, and
thus, half of such funds belonged to him and the other half belonged to his
wife's estate. Mary Stauffer responded that the funds in the account be-
longed to her by right of survivorship.
(ii) the amount which is necessary (or would have been necessary) to bring
the institution into compliance with all capital standards applicable with re-
spect to such institution as of the time the institution fails to comply with a
plan. (emphasis added).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(Supp. 1990).
126. Fed Wins on Jurisdiction in MCorp Case, but no Ruling on Source of Strength Rule, 57
BANKING REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 941, 942.
127. 801 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1990).
128. Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
1282 [Vol. 45
BANKING LAW
The Texas supreme court, in considering title to the balance in the ac-
count, traced the development of joint tenancies with the right of survivor-
ship. The Henderson court noted that section 46 of the Probate Code, as
originally adopted, stated that the interest of a joint owner who dies:
shall descend to ... the heirs ...of such deceased joint owner
... [p]rovided, however, that by agreement in writing of joint owners of
property, the interest of any joint owner who dies may be made to sur-
vive to the surviving joint owner or joint owners, but no such agreement
shall be inferred from the mere fact that the property is held in joint
ownership. 129
Section 46 explicitly authorized joint owners to provide for the funds re-
maining in the bank account to pass to the surviving joint owner. The lan-
guage of section 46, however, prohibited the courts from inferring a right of
survivorship from the establishment of a joint account because individuals
often established such accounts for convenience.1 30 In other words, section
46 permitted joint tenancies with right of survivorship but did not permit
courts to infer the existence of survivorship rights. Instead, courts needed to
determine the parties' intent.
The Henderson court noted that the depository agreement is typically the
only writing that reflects the parties' intent. The purpose of such agree-
ments, however, is to permit the financial institution to pay funds at either
cosignor's direction. Thus, courts in the State of Texas historically followed
the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Krueger v. Williams13 ' in per-
mitting parole evidence to be admitted to assist the court in divining the
parties' intent.
The Texas Probate Code was amended in 1979, when the legislature,
among other things, added section 439(a).132 At that time, section 439(a)
provided:
Sums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to a joint account
belong to the surviving party or parties against the estate of the dece-
dent if, by a written agreement signed by the party who dies, the inter-
est of such deceased party is made to survive to the surviving party or
parties. A survivorship agreement will not be inferred from the mere
fact that the account is a joint account. 33
The Texas supreme court in Henderson determined that section 439(a)
changed the law. 134 Consequently, after the enactment of section 439(a), a
right of survivorship could only be created if the decedent executed a written
agreement pursuant to which the decedent's interest was "made to survive to
the surviving party or parties."' 35 If the provisions of a written agreement
are clear, then parole evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the
129. Id. at 860 quoting Law of Sept. 1, 1956, Ch. 55 § 46, 1955, TEX. Gen. Laws 88, 103
(emphasis added).
130. 801 S.W.2d at 861.
131. 163 Tex. 545, 359 S.W.2d 48 (1962).
132. Law of Aug. 27, 1979, ch. 713, § 31, 1979, Tex. Gen. Laws 1740, 1758.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. 801 S.W.2d at 863.




The Henderson court then turned to the signature card, which was the
"6agreement" between Marian Henderson and Mary Stauffer. The signature
card provided that upon the death of one accountholder, the funds on de-
posit may be withdrawn by the survivor, and that such withdrawal was bind-
ing upon the decedent's heirs.' 37 The Henderson court implicitly decided
that such language did not create a right of survivorship because the agree-
ment lacked the words from the statute: "made to survive to the surviving
party or parties."' 38 As a result, the effect of the agreement was only to
authorize the payment of funds by the depository to the survivor. Presuma-
bly, the Henderson court determined that the signature card permitted the
bank to pay the balance to the survivor and made such payment binding on
the decedent's heirs in order to protect the bank, but not to establish title to
such funds.139
The Henderson court, however, effectively prohibited introduction of evi-
dence regarding the parties' actual intent in order to apply its own subjective
beliefs regarding the parties' motivation. 40 The Henderson court's conclu-
sion ignored the provision of the signature card that made any withdrawal
by the survivor binding on the decedent's estate. Why would the agreement
contain such language if not to create a right of survivorship? The Dissent
recognized and rejected the formalistic analysis of the majority opinion.
The Dissent noted that the legislature, when it adopted section 439(a),
intended to codify existing law and not to change it. '4' Before the 1979
amendments, the "made to survive" phrase of section 46 had been inter-
preted to permit parole evidence of the parties' intent.142 Several decisions
prior to section 439(a) had interpreted language that was more ambiguous
than the provision of the signature card at issue in Henderson as creating a
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. 143 Under Krueger and its progeny,
the Dissent would have presumed that the signature card Mrs. Henderson
executed created a right of survivorship unless parole evidence reflected a
different intent. 44
136. Id. at 863-64.
137. See supra text accompanying note 123.
138. 801 S.W.2d at 865-66.
139. Id. at 861.
140. Interestingly, Mrs. Henderson left her estate to her sister, Mary Stauffer, and not to
her husband. Id. at 872. Presumably, she would have desired for the balance in her account to
be treated similarly.
141. Id. citing Interim Study Report on Nontestamentary Transfers Presented to Houston
Judiciary Committee: Recommendation No. 36., 66th Leg. R. S. (1979).
142. 801 S.W.2d at 867.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 870.
The Probate Code has now been amended to provide that an agreement contain-
ing substantially the following language creates survivorship rights: "On the
death of one party to a joint account, all sums ... vest in... the surviving party
as his or her separate property and estate." TEX. PROB. CODE. ANN. § 439(a)
(Vernon Supp. 1988). The Dissent advised practitioners to use the language of
the statute in light of the majority's emphasis on "magic words" in Henderson.
801 S.W.2d at 872 n.7.
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2. Insurance of Accounts
Spawn v. Western Bank-Westheimer 145 involved a challenge by a deposi-
tor of an insolvent bank to the FDIC's denial of insurance coverage. The
plaintiff and his sister owned two $100,000 certificates of deposit at Western
Bank-Westheimer. The signature cards for the certificates of deposit each
bore the names of both plaintiff and his sister and indicated that each certifi-
cate was held by plaintiff and his sister jointly with right of survivorship.
The FDIC determined that both of the certificates of deposit were joint ac-
counts and that the two together were insurable in a total amount of only$100,000.146 Plaintiff maintained that despite the signature cards, one certif-
icate of deposit consisted of his solely owned funds and the other consisted
of his sister's solely owned funds. Plaintiff maintained that each certificate
of deposit was separately insurable and that together they were insurable in a
total amount of $200,000. 147
The appeals court noted that both plaintiff and his sister personally exe-
cuted a signature card and possessed withdrawal rights with respect to each
certificate of deposit, and that these facts meant that each certificate of de-
posit met the general standards for a joint account.1 48 However, the appeals
court also noted that section 330.9(b) contained additional language that
stated that the signature card and withdrawal rights standards were not ap-
plicable to certificates of deposit. 149 The court interpreted this additional
language as requiring only that a certificate of deposit in fact be jointly
owned in order for the certificate of deposit to be deemed jointly owned for
145. 925 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1991).
146. The court notes that FDIC's determination was made under FDIC's deposit insur-
ance regulations in effect before the adoption of FIRREA (see supra note 90). Following the
adoption of FIRREA, those regulations were extensively revised in 55 Fed. Reg. 20,111
(1990). The pre-FIRREA regulation on which FDIC based its determination that each of the
certificates of deposit was a joint account of plaintiff and his sister was 12 C.F.R. § 330.9(b),
which provided:
(b) Qualifying joint accounts. A joint deposit account shall be deemed to exist,
for purposes of insurance of accounts, only if each coowner has personally exe-
cuted a deposit account signature card and possesses withdrawal rights. The
restrictions of this paragraph shall not apply to coowners of a time certificate of
deposit or to any deposit obligation evidenced by a negotiable instrument, but
such a deposit must in fact be jointly owned.
12 C.F.R. § 330.9(b) (1990). The $100,000 limitation on joint accounts held by the same indi-
viduals was the result of 12 C.F.R. § 330.9(d), which provided:
(d) Same combination of individuals. All joint deposit accounts owned by the
same combination of individuals shall first be added together and insured up to
$100,000 in the aggregate.
12 C.F.R. § 330.9(d) (1990). For a comparison with current deposit insurance regulations, see
infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
147. Prior to the revision of FDIC's deposit insurance regulations (see supra note 146), 12
C.F.R. § 330.2(a) provided:
(a) Individual accounts. Funds owned by an individual (or by the community
between husband and wife of which the individual is a member) and deposited in
one or more deposit accounts in his own name shall be insured up to $100,000 in
the aggregate.
12 C.F.R. § 330.2(a) (1990).




deposit insurance purposes.' 50 Thus, the question of joint ownership of a
certificate of deposit was determined in this case by the facts of the situation,
not by reference to the bank's records. The FDIC contended that 12 C.F.R.
section 330. l(b)(1) 15 1 required that bank records be the sole reference in de-
termining deposit insurance coverage and precluded examination of any
other source, such as state law, to determine insurance coverage.' 52 The
appeals court rejected this contention on three grounds. First, the appeals
court stated that section 330.1(b)(1) was meant to address the problem of a
claimed interest in a deposit by a claimant whose interest does not appear in
the insolvent bank's records, a different problem from the one in this case. 113
Second, section 330. l(b)(1) addressed the establishment of the existence of a
relationship rather than the nonexistence of a relationship. 154 Third, section
330.9(b) controlled section 330. l(b)(1) because the former was more specific
than the latter, making section 330.9(b) an exception to the general rule of
section 330. 1(b)(1). 55 The appeals court required that plaintiff be given the
opportunity to prove that the certificates of deposit were not in fact jointly
owned. 156
Although decided pursuant to deposit insurance regulations no longer in
effect,157 Spawn is relevant because of the similarity between current deposit
insurance regulations and former sections 330.9(b) and 330. l(b)(1). Current
12 C.F.R. section 330.7(c) 58 excepts certificates of deposit from the signa-
ture card requirement and also requires that a certificate of deposit be, in
fact, jointly owned in order to qualify as a joint account, as did section
330.9(b). Current 12 C.F.R. section 330.4(a) 159 refers solely to a failed
150. 925 F.2d at 888.
151. Former 12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(1) provided:
(b) Records. (1) The deposit account records of the insured bank shall be con-
clusive as to the existence of any relationship pursuant to which the funds in the
account are deposited and on which a claim for insurance coverage is founded.
Examples would be trustee, agent, custodian or executor. No claim for insur-
ance based on such a relationship will be recognized in the absence of such
disclosure.
12 C.F.R. § 330.1(b)(1) (1990).
152. 925 F.2d at 888.
153. Id. at 888-89.
154. Id. at 889.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See supra note 146.
158. 12 C.F.R. § 330.7(c) provides in part:
(c) Qualifying joint accounts. A joint deposit account shall be deemed to be a
qualifying joint account, for purposes of this section, only if:
(1) All co-owners of the funds in the account are natural persons; and
(2) Each co-owner has personally signed a deposit account signature card;
and
(3) Each co-owner possesses withdrawal rights on the same basis.
The requirement of paragraph (c)(2) of this section relating to account signature cards
shall not apply to certificates of deposit, to any deposit obligation evidenced by a negotia-
ble instrument, or to any account maintained by an agent, nominee, guardian, custodian
or conservator on behalf of two or more persons, but all such deposits must, in fact, be
jointly owned.
12 C.F.R. § 330.7(c) (1991).
159. 12 C.F.R. § 330.4(a) provides in part:
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bank's account records in determining deposit insurance without discussing
apparent exceptions contained elsewhere in the insurance regulations, as did
section 330.1(b). Although the language of the current regulations is not
identical to the language of the previous regulations, the language and ap-
parent purpose of the relevant sections appears sufficiently similar to make
Spawn applicable under the revised regulations.
The Spawn court also discussed' 60 whether the appropriate standard for
the court's review of the FDIC's deposit insurance determination was the de
novo standard of Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC 16 1 or the arbi-
trary and capricious standard set forth in the Administrative Procedure
Act. 162 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Spawn applied the
same reasoning in deciding this issue as it used in Patrick A. Hymel, CL U &
Assoc. v. FDIC.16 3 Hymel also involved a depositor's challenge to a determi-
nation regarding insurance coverage. In Hymel the Fifth Circuit noted that
Coit dealt with determinations made by a federal deposit insurer (FSLIC)
acting as receiver of an insolvent institution in adjudicating state law
claims. 164 Hymel distinguished Coit from depositors' challenges to insur-
ance determinations by stating that courts have long recognized a difference
between the authority of a federal deposit insurer acting as receiver of an
insolvent financial institution and acting as an insurer of deposits, making
the more rigorous review of Coit inapplicable to challenges of actions under-
taken as an insurer of deposits.' 6 5 Hymel also observed that Coit involved
an attempt by the FSLIC to adjudicate a variety of claims arising under state
law and not, as in Hymel, the determination by a deposit insurer of deposit
insurance claims arising under a federal statutory program administered by
(a) Recognition of deposit ownership -
(1) Evidence of deposit ownership. In determining the amount of insurance
available to each depositor, the FDIC shall presume that deposited funds are
actually owned in the manner indicated on the deposit account records of the
insured depository institution. If the FDIC, in its sole discretion, determines
that the deposit account records of the insured depository institution are clear
and unambiguous, those records shall be considered binding on the depositor,
and no other records shall be considered, as to the manner in which the funds
are owned. If the deposit account records are ambiguous or unclear as to the
manner in which the funds are owned, then the FDIC may, in its sole discretion,
consider evidence other than the deposit account records of the insured deposi-
tory institution for the purpose of establishing the manner in which the funds
are owned.
12 C.F.R. § 330.4(a) (1991).
160. 925 F.2d at 887.
161. 489 U.S. 561 (1989), which held in part that FSLIC's adjudication of creditor claims
against a failed savings and loan was subject to de novo judicial review because FSLIC lacked
legislative authority to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.
162. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) provides that a court reviewing an agency action pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act may set aside any agency action, findings or conclusions found
by the court to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law. 5 U.S.C.S. § 706(2)(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
163. 925 F.2d at 887, citing Patrick A. Hymel, CLU & Assoc. v. FDIC, 925 F.2d 881, 883
(5th Cir. 1991).
164. 925 F.2d at 882-83.
165. Id. at 883.
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a federal agency. 166 The Fifth Circuit determined that Coit did not control
Hymel and that the proper standard of review remained the Administrative
Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard, as determined by a pre-
Coit Fifth Circuit case.167
E. Bank Crimes
Two cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit flesh out
the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 - the Bank Fraud statute.168 In 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 1344 provided as follows:
(a) [w]hoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or
artifice
(1) to defraud a federally chartered or insured financial institu-
tion; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities
or other property owned by or under the custody or control of a
federally chartered or insured financial institution by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, shall
be [fined or imprisoned]. 169
In US. v. Hooten,170 the court considered whether the actions of Larry
Hooten, an Assistant Vice President of San Antonio Credit Union (SACU),
were actionable under the Bank Fraud Statute.
Morris Jaffe, Jr. borrowed $1.5 million from SACU. Mr. Hooten served
as the loan officer responsible for monitoring Mr. Jaffe's indebtedness. Mr.
Jaffe received a series of anonymous letters offering to sell him the original
note he executed payable to SACU. One letter included a copy of the note
stamped "paid." Mr. Hooten subsequently admitted that he had sent the
letters, but stated that he did not intend either to provide the note to Mr.
Jaffe or to defraud SACU.
Mr. Hooten contended that his conduct did not represent bank fraud or
attempted bank fraud. He stated that if his scheme had succeeded, he would
have defrauded Mr. Jaffe and not SACU because even without the note
SACU could have collected on Mr. Jaffe's obligation.' 7' The jury deter-
mined, however, that Mr. Hooten's plan was for Mr. Jaffe to employ the
note to avoid his obligation to SACU.1 72 Thus, the Hooten court sustained
the bank fraud conviction.
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in US. v.
Briggs 173 determined that Susan Briggs did not commit bank fraud when she
diverted in excess of $5 million of her employers' funds to her own accounts
166. Id.
167. Id., citing Godwin v. FSLIC, 806 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1987).
168. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1984).
169. Id.
170. 933 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1991).
171. If SACU did not have possession of the note, however, it would not have been entitled
to the protection afforded to holders of negotiable instruments. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 3.104 (Vernon 1987) (prerequisites for negotiable instruments).
172. 933 F.2d at 295.
173. 939 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1991).
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or accounts in the name of affiliated parties. Ms. Briggs was employed by
Electronic Data Systems (EDS) and Southmark Corporation (Southmark).
On several occasions, she initiated wire transfers from her employers' ac-
counts to accounts for her benefit. The record reflected that EDS and a
Southmark subsidiary incurred the losses from Ms. Briggs' scheme. The
Briggs court noted that the record did not indicate that the bank experienced
any loss as a consequence of Ms. Briggs' actions. The government did not
contend that Ms. Briggs attempted to acquire bank funds, but instead, that
"she attempted to obtain funds under the custody and control of the
banks." 174 Accordingly, the government sought to convict Ms. Briggs under
the second clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.175
The Briggs court stated that a scheme or artifice to constitute bank fraud
must seek to obtain funds by "false or fraudulent pretenses, representations
or promises."' 176 The government contended that by instructing the bank to
wire funds, Ms. Briggs implied that she had the requisite authority over such
funds to do so. The Briggs court responded that a wire transfer order is not
an explicit false representation. 177
The Briggs court noted that the impermissibly obtained funds did not be-
long to a financial institution and the court seemed to be influenced by that
fact. 178 Consequently, the court did not wish to interpret the bank fraud
statute in an expansive manner. The court, however, also interpreted its
own decision narrowly. The Briggs court stated that it was not holding that
a misrepresentation can never be associated with a wire transfer order. 179
Instead, the court held that the act of instructing a bank to wire funds, with-
out more, is not a misrepresentation.180
174. Id. at 225.
175. Id. The second clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 now provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other
property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution,
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
18 U.S.C.S. § 1344(a)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
176. 939 F.2d at 226 quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2) (1984).
177. 939 F.2d at 226. The Briggs court stated that it was following the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279 (1982). In Williams, the govern-
ment sought to convict the defendant for making a false statement to a financial institution
under 18 U.S.C. § 1014. The defendant had allegedly engaged in a "check kiting" scheme.
The Williams court stated that neither the act of depositing checks nor the checks themselves
are false statements because a check is not a statement of fact that can be either true or false.
Id. at 284-85. In Briggs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit analogized the wire
transfer order at issue to the checks deposited by Williams. 939 F.2d at 226. Cf U.S. v.
Falcone, 939 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1991) (shareholders and directors of an insurance company
violated the Bank Fraud Statute when they used the company's facsimile signature stamp to
obtain company funds in the possession of a bank).
178. 939 F.2d at 227 (The Briggs court observed that the conduct at issue fell "outside the
core of concerns" of the Bank Fraud statute).
179. Id.
180. The Briggs court observed that if Ms. Briggs had stated that she possessed the author-





A. Supervision of Insiders
1. Leases with Insiders
The legislature adopted an amendment to article 342-401 of the Texas
Banking Code of 1943, as amended (the Banking Code),' 8 ' requiring a state
bank to obtain the written consent of the Banking Commissioner (Commis-
sioner) prior to entering into any "lease arrangement"' 8 2 with an executive
officer, director, principal shareholder (collectively Insiders) of the bank or a
company controlled by an Insider. The Texas Department of Banking (the
Banking Department) perceived that the terms of such transactions were
often the result of overreaching by Insiders. 8 3 Accordingly, the purpose of
this legislation was to eliminate the potential for abuse that the Banking
Department believed was inherent in such transactions. 18 4
The statute did not define the terms "executive officer," "director," "prin-
cipal shareholder," or "control." Federal Banking regulations, most notably
Regulation 0,185 however, do provide definitions of such terms. Accord-
ingly, it is likely a court will refer to those regulations for guidance.
2. Disclosure of Supervisory Information
Senate Bill No. 523 (S.B. 523)186 amended the Banking Code to authorize
the Commissioner to disclose virtually any information concerning the finan-
cial condition of a state bank or its parent holding company to banking offi-
cials of other states. Previously, the Commissioner was only expressly
permitted to provide such information to Texas officials and federal banking
authorities. The purpose of this provision is to prevent individuals, who the
Banking Department found to have caused problems for banks in the State
of Texas, from starting with a "clean slate" by moving to another state.187
S.B. 523 also permits individuals to furnish employment information to a
financial institution8 8 concerning the "known involvement" of a current or
former officer or director (presumably of a financial institution) in a legal
181. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-418 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
182. The term "lease arrangement" includes renewals and extensions of existing leases. Id.
183. Graham, 1991 Legislative Recommendations, 4th Annual Banking Law Conference,
Jan. 31 and Feb. 1, 1991 (hereinafter "Banking Department Recommendations") (the speaker,
who is the General Counsel for the Banking Department, asserted that the Banking Depart-
ment had witnessed "significant abuse" as a result of leases between banks and their insiders.)
184. The FDIC promulgated regulations that if adopted will subject transactions between
an insured state non-member bank and its insiders, including lease transactions, to certain
procedural and documentation requirements. Peter Weinstock, COMMENT/Insider Deals
Face Closer Scrutiny.... AM. BANKER, Oct. 4, 1991, at 4 col. 1.
185. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1991). Regulation 0 sets forth procedures for and certain limits on
extensions of credit by a bank to its insiders.
186. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
187. Independent Bankers Association of Texas, 1991 Regional Legislative Update Series(1991) (hereinafter "Update Series") (the purpose of S.B. 523 is to "clean up bad apples in
banking by making it difficult for them to skip to another state and resume a banking career.")
188. Senate Bill 523 defines the term "financial institution" to mean a state or federal sav-
ings association, a state or national bank or a savings bank with an office in the State of Texas.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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violation. 189 The bill further stated that no one may be held civilly liable for
providing such information unless the information was false and was pro-
vided in disregard for the truth.' 90
3. Advisory Director Eligibility
The legislature amended the Banking Code to prohibit an advisory direc-
tor from serving with a state bank if the bank had charged off indebtedness
owed to it by that individual or if that individual had been convicted of a
felony. 191 Previously, only directors were subject to disqualification on these
bases. 19 2 The Banking Department proposed this amendment because it de-
sired to prevent individuals of "questionable character and integrity" from
being involved in the affairs of state banks. 193
B. Statewide Branch Banking
1. Branches
The 1988 federal district court decision in State v. Clarke194 permitted
national banks located in the State of Texas to establish branches anywhere
within the state. The Banking Department applied the "wild card" stat-
ute1 95 to afford state-chartered banks with equivalent treatment. The legisla-
ture recognized the reality of state-wide branch banking by amending the
Banking Code to provide explicit authorization for state banks to branch
without geographic restriction. 196
The amendments also permit state banks to change their domicile or head
office to any location within the State of Texas.1 97 In contrast, national
banks are only permitted to move their domicile to within thirty miles of the
border of the town, county or city in which their domicile is currently lo-
cated.' 98 The legislature also authorized the Banking Department to estab-
lish emergency procedures to enable state banks, when they acquire assets
and assume liabilities of failed savings banks and of savings and loan associa-
tions, to establish branches at the former locations of such institutions. 199
Perhaps most importantly, the amendment permits the Banking Depart-
ment to reject a branch application if it has supervisory concerns regarding
"affiliates" 2° ° of the state bank, such as the bank's parent holding com-
189. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
190. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-210(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
191. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-404 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
192. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-405 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
193. Banking Department Recommendations, supra note 178, at 34.
194. 690 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
195. TEX. Const. art. XVI § 16(c) (providing state banks the "same rights and privileges"
as are or may be afforded to national banks).
196. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
197. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-314 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
198. 12 U.S.C.S. § 30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
199. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
200. The statute defines the term "affiliate" to mean a company or similar entity that con-
trols, is controlled by or is under common control with a state bank. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art 342-903 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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pany.201 Previously, it was questionable whether the Banking Department's
jurisdiction extended to entities other than the bank itself.
2 Automatic Teller Machines
The changes to the Banking Code provisions governing automatic teller
machines (ATMs) also reflect the reality of statewide branching.20 2 When
the State of Texas was a "unit" bank state, banks were only permitted to
operate ATMs in their city or county of domicile. Now many banks have
branches in communities other than where their headquarters is located.
The amendment to the Banking Code permits banks to operate ATMs in any
locality within the state.20 3
C. Appraisals
Congress believed that inflated and otherwise improper appraisals were a
material contributing factor to the savings and loan crisis. Consequently,
Congress decided to establish minimum standards for both appraiser qualifi-
cations and appraisals. Thus, when Congress adopted FIRREA,2 04 it man-
dated, among other things, that appraisals, in connection with "real estate-
related financial transactions, ' '20 5 be performed by licensed or certified ap-
praisers. Congress provided for the states to determine the specifics of test-
ing and regulation, but established the Appraisal Subcommittee of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council to oversee such
efforts. 206
The Appraiser Licensing and Certification Act (the Licensing and Certifi-
cation Act)20 7 brought the State of Texas into compliance with FIRREA by
providing a system for licensing and certification of appraisers and by creat-
ing the Texas Real Estate Appraiser Board (the Board) to regulate the ap-
praisal industry in the State of Texas. To become a licensed appraiser, a
person must pass a written examination, complete 75 hours of class, includ-
ing 15 hours relating to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal
Practice, and possess 2,000 hours of experience regarding appraisals.20 8
201. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
202. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903(a) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
203. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-903(a) § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
204. Pub. L. No. 101-73. § 1101, 103 Stat. 183 (1989).
205. FIRREA defines a "real estate-related financial transaction" as:
any transaction involving
(A) the sale, lease, purchase, investment in or exchange of real property,
including interests in property, or the financing thereof;
(B) the refinancing of real property or interests in real property; and
(C) the use of real property or interests in property as security for a loan or
investment, including mortgage-backed securities.
Id. § 1121(5), 103 Stat. at 517.
206. FIRREA amended The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Act of
1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3301-3308, to require the creation of a subcommittee to implement FIR-
REA's dictates concerning appraisals. Id. § 1102, § 1022, 103 Stat. at 511-12.
207. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a.2 (Vernon Supp. 1992). The Licensing and
Certification Act abolished the previous requirement that appraisers had to be licensed real
estate brokers. Id. § 18.
208. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a.2 § 9(b) (Vernon Supp. 1992). The Licensing
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Similarly, to obtain the designation of certification, an individual must also
pass an examination, which is presumably more rigorous than the licensing
examination, complete the number of hours of class specified by the Ap-
praiser Qualifications Board, and possess 2,000 hours of experience regard-
ing appraisals. 2°9 It is a misdemeanor under the Licensing and Certification
Act for an individual to represent himself or herself as having obtained a
license or certification when he or she does not possess such qualifications. 210
The Licensing and Certification Act also created the Board as an in-
dependent agency to oversee the appraisal industry. 21I The Board is
charged with appointing a Commissioner to administer the Licensing and
Certification Act.212 The Board is also empowered to apply sanctions for
violation of the Licensing and Certification Act.213 The only sanction stated
in the Licensing and Certification Act, however, is the power to revoke a
license or certification. Accordingly, it is unclear what other enforcement
powers the Board possesses.
D. Safe Deposit Boxes
An additional piece of legislation adopted by the legislature during its
1991 Regular Session was House Bill No. 41 (H.B. 41) governing the reloca-
tion of safe deposit boxes.21 4 H.B. 41 prohibits the relocation of a safe de-
posit box or the opening of a safe deposit box for the relocation of its
contents unless conducted in the lessee's presence or with the lessee's written
permission or following the giving of notice to the lessee or as otherwise
permitted by law.21 5 H.B. 41 permits a relocation if at least thirty days'
notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, is provided to each lessee of
the safe deposit box.21 6 If relocation occurs without the personal supervision
or written authorization of the lessee, notice to the lessee containing the new
box number or location is required within thirty days after the date of relo-
cation.21 7 In addition, if such a relocation occurs and the box is opened, an
inventory of the box's contents must be conducted by two bank employees,
at least one of whom must be an officer or manager and a notary public. 218
H.B. 41 contains two specific exceptions to its requirements, allowing reloca-
tion without the permission or presence of and without notice to the lessee if
relocation is necessitated by natural disaster or other unforeseeable circum-
stances beyond the bank's control or if the safe deposit box rental is
and Certification Act provides that service as a real estate lending officer may be used to meet
the experience requirement for a license or certification, provided a real estate lending officer
regularly reviews appraisals as part of his or her job responsibilities. Id. § 9(c).
209. Id. § 9(a) (1991).
210. Id. § 21.
211. Id. § 5.
212. Id. § 6(k).
213. Id. § 12.
214. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-906 (Vernon Supp. 1992).







The legislature also adopted House Bill No. 1598 (H.B. 1598) concerning
the imprinting of safe deposit box keys. 220 H.B. 1598 requires that all keys
issued to a safe deposit box by a bank after September 1, 1992, be imprinted
with the bank's routing number or have a tag attached bearing the bank's
routing number.221 If a bank believes that the routing number on a safe
deposit box key or attached tag has been altered or defaced, the bank is
required to notify the Department of Public Safety.222 A bank that complies
with the imprinting requirements of H.B. 1598 and that follows applicable
law and its established security procedures in permitting access to a safe
deposit box is not liable for any damages arising because of access given to
any individual or the resulting removal of the box's contents.223
H.B. 1598 is somewhat ambiguous as to whether it requires the imprinting
of all safe deposit box keys that have been issued as of September 1, 1992,
and are issued thereafter or the imprinting of only those safe deposit box
keys that are issued thereafter.224 However, the legislative history of the bill,
together with testimony before the House Financial Institutions Committee
and statements by H.B. 1598's author indicate that the bill was intended to
require that all keys issued prior to or after September 1, 1992, be im-
printed. 225 It should be noted that the obligation to imprint a key arises only
when a bank rents or permits access to a safe deposit box,226 thus sparing
banks from the obligation to imprint keys issued prior to September 1, 1992,
unless the holder desires access to the box.
The purpose of H.B. 1598 is to aid law enforcement officials in locating,
tracing, or identifying proceeds from illegal activities.227 Imprinting of safe
deposit box keys is intended to allow law enforcement officials who have
recovered a safe deposit box key in the course of an investigation to identify
the bank at which the relevant box is located. 228 Currently the possession of
a safe deposit key by itself does not provide much assistance to law enforce-
ment officials, because such keys are generally very similar in appearance
and do not identify the bank where the box is located. 229
It is interesting to note that both H.B. 1598 and H.B. 41 amend the same
statute and that H.B. 1598 restates the relevant statute without incorporat-
ing the changes contained in H.B. 41. As H.B. 1598 was passed after H.B.
219. Id.
220. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-906 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
221. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 342-906(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. The relevant language of H.B. 1598 provides that a bank "shall imprint all keys issued
to the box after September 1, 1992." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-906(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1992).
225. Texas Bankers Association Legal Briefs, No. 91-08, at I (Sept. 10, 1991).
226. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 342-906(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).





41, it is unclear as to whether this presumably inadvertent omission repealed
H.B. 41.
'E. Petroleum Storage Tanks
H.B. No. 1214 (H.B. 1214) was an important bill adopted by the legisla-
ture to modify provisions of the statute governing the petroleum storage
tank remediation fund.230 The petroleum storage tank remediation fund is a
fund administered by the Texas Water Commission from which owners and
operators of petroleum storage tanks can be reimbursed for a portion of the
costs of correcting contamination caused by their tanks.231 H.B. 1214 pro-
vides that a bank's security interest in a petroleum storage tank, in real prop-
erty on which a tank is located or in personal property located on such real
property does not in itself make the bank liable under the Texas Water Code
as an owner or operator for contamination caused by the tank.232 H.B. 1214
also provides that a lender that exercises the control of a mortgagee-in-pos-
session over property in which it has a security interest is not liable under
the Texas Water Code as an owner or operator for contamination caused by
tanks on the property unless the bank's actions cause or exacerbate the con-
tamination. 233 H.B. 1214 further provides that, if a lender forecloses upon a
security interest in real or personal property or acquires real property by a
deed in lieu of foreclosure, the lender is not liable under the Texas Water
Code as an owner or operator for contamination caused by tanks associated
with the property if the lender removes the tanks from service and takes
such corrective action with respect to existing contamination as is required
by the Texas Water Commission's rules. 234 Lastly, H.B. 1214 provides that
a lender with a security interest in property contaminated by petroleum stor-
age tanks or with an ownership interest in such property as a result of fore-
closure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is eligible for reimbursement from the
petroleum storage tank remediation fund for costs incurred in taking correc-
tive action with respect to the contamination. 235
IV. CONCLUSION
In response to the savings and loan crisis, Congress has provided the fed-
eral banking agencies with an extraordinary degree of discretion. Many of
the cases decided during this Survey period explore the limits of such lati-
tude. We expect the courts will be grappling with such issues for the foresee-
able future.
230. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3524 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
231. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3573 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
232. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3514 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
233. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3514(c) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
234. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3514(d) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
235. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.3571 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
19921 1295

